"IMPROVING FRIENDLY NETWORKS TO EFFECTIVELY COMBAT VIOLENT EXTREMIST NETWORKS"
In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States" safety and security…are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves….
-Robert M. Gates 1 The complexity of the contemporary international environment has created a significant shift to both U.S. national security objectives and the necessary means to meet those objectives. These new challenges have made it apparent that the U.S. is not only unable to unilaterally absorb the resource costs of conducting sustained operations in multiple regions, but that building partner nation capacity (BPC) is the most effective way to create a global security network to counter the intent of violent extremist organizations (VEO). The U.S. President"s National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasizes a national security requirement to improve our nation"s BPC capabilities.
There have been many efforts by both the Departments of Defense and State (DoD, DoS) to meet the intent of the NSS. However, there is strong evidence that both departments are struggling to meet this objective. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of improving friendly network capabilities to more effectively combat al Qaeda and associated extremist organizations" terrorism. To accomplish this, this paper will include the following: a review of the background and description of the complex contemporary environment resulting in a renewed focus on stability operations compared to combat operations, a brief review of principal documents that articulate the United States Government"s (USG) grand strategy to further develop the effectiveness of friendly networks, a comparison of the intent behind Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 7500 and related guidance in the principal documents, and a description of DoD and DoS network deficiencies. Finally, this paper will provide a variety of proposed solutions to improve friendly network capabilities to meet NSS objectives related to BPC.
Background and Contemporary Environment
In the near future, the most damaging threats to U.S. interests and national security are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately provide the necessary social programs or security for their people. Securing a successful process to strengthen both the U.S. Government"s internal networks and that of international partners is the predominant security challenge. However, a successful process is an extremely complex institutional challenge. Soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the George W. Bush Administration linked the development of our partners with national security goals in the 2002 and 2006 NSS. 2 However, almost ten years later, the USG continues to struggle with developing the capability and capacity to effectively develop the security of our partners. The challenge is one that the U.S. must overcome. U.S.
President Barack Obama reinforced the necessity of the issue in the 2010 NSS:
The United States must improve its capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence. We will undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote regional security and respect for human rights and the rule of law. 3 The Secretary of Defense has identified "building partner capacity" (BPC) as a critical "way" to "helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance. 4 The U.S." utilization of a form of BPC began prior to its entrance Wherever al-Qa"ida or its terrorist affiliates attempt to establish a safe haven-as they have in Yemen, Somalia, the Maghreb, and the Sahelwe will meet them with growing pressure. We also will strengthen our own network of partners to disable al-Qa"ida"s financial, human, and planning networks; disrupt terrorist operations before they mature; and address potential safe-havens before al-Qa"ida and its terrorist affiliates can take root. These efforts will focus on information-sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and establishing new practices to counter evolving adversaries. We will also help states avoid becoming terrorist safe havens by helping them build their capacity for responsible governance and security through development and security sector assistance. 19 Although the NSS is general in content by design, the U.S. President furthers both the importance and clarity of his guidance when highlighting his strategy for security of "At-
Risk States:"
The United States must improve its capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence. We will undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote regional security and respect for human rights and the rule of law. SFA is very similar to SC in that it is a tool to assist with BPC, but SFA is an umbrella term that includes DoD activities within a whole-of-government approach, i.e., unified action by all USG departments and agencies. As often discussed, the world has grown increasingly flat through globalization.
The center of gravity is now with the people. This is evidenced today in America"s limited wars with non-state actors. Theater commanders routinely place the "population" at both the friendly and enemy centers of gravity. Admiral Olson maintains this point:
The conflicts in which we are engaged are not going to be resolved by…the Department of Defense. These conflicts are bigger than us; they will require a global effort to complete successfully….We see Westphalian states dominating the political construct, but non-state actors will compete more vigorously with nation-states for influence over populations [emphasis added]. The direct approach is urgent, necessary, chaotic and kinetic, and the effects are mostly short term. But they are not decisive. Enduring results come from the indirect [emphasis in original] approaches-those in which we enable partners to combat violent extremist organizations themselves by contributing to their capabilities through training, equipment, transfer of technology, wargaming, and so forth. 
Interagency Process Shortcomings
Many observers have argued the USG is slow to move toward fighting the current asymmetric threat, in which the population is the center of gravity. Just as funds are appropriated to the State Department, which often transfers them to DoD, which in turn manages and executes most security assistance programs…. Title 22 is less flexible in some ways, mainly because Congress authorizes and appropriates these funds on a bycountry and by program basis, and requires congressional notification and permission to move funds from one effort to another. funds are appropriated to DoD and are intended for operations and maintenance of the U.S. military. These funds are often used to fund international participation in U.S. joint exercises, military personnel exchanges, or military-to-military contacts as a way to enhance the relationships between partner militaries and U.S. forces.
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In addition to the Rand study, a Joint Special Operations University Monograph by George A. Crawford categorize USG dysfunctional efforts at combating terrorism using three categories: strategic, or national level; operational, or regional level; and, tactical, or local level. 34 For purposes of this paper, I will use the national, regional, and local levels to separate further analysis or descriptions.
National Level. At the national level, because of the different authorities between
Title 10 and Title 22 discussed previously, each funding code has intuitively created separate organizations and cultures leading to stovepiped approaches when working with partner nations. Additionally, DoD produces multiyear funding programs while the DoS works on a single-year mentality. 35 One can easily see this de-linked planning effort detracts from a synchronized strategic effort to build critical allies" security capacity.
Most likely the most significant causal factor is the disproportion between the DoD and the DoS workforce. With such fewer people working in DoS compared to the DoD, it would be impossible for DoS personnel to match man-for-man DoD"s planning and expeditionary capacity. As of September 2010, the DoS comprised 29,098 full time employees, whereas the DoD comprised approximately 2.2 million active duty and civilian personnel (1.4 million active duty and 750,000 civilians). 36 Stated bluntly, the FY10 DoS manpower level is "decimal dust" when compared to DoD levels.
Although NSPD 44 and DODD 3000.05 recognize the renewed importance of BPC to further U.S. national interests, the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the interagency process, by design, equate to dysfunction in the contemporary environment. Created primarily by the National Security Act of 1947, the interagency process is characterized by constant turf battles between agencies and departments and is further complicated with biased cultures within each organization. In a world where great power is exercised by primarily one nation, the U.S. is encumbered by the 1947 Act, and therefore is slower to act than its enemies and partners to quickly fund projects, sell equipment, and build necessary relationships. 37 The various functions of BPC are also scattered within DoD itself, making efficiency a significant institutional challenge.
Secretary Gates clarifies the interagency dysfunction: "For all the improvements of recent years," the tools of the interagency remain to be "a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities…and unwieldy processes." Recognizing a lack of efficiency at the national level, President Obama"s administration decided that the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and the National Security Council (NSC) "should be supported by a single National Security Staff." 39 In principle, strategic policy and strategy decisions should be markedly more efficient with the merging of the NSC and HSC staffs under the National Security Staff. However, as mentioned earlier with postwar Iraq, the inherent problems with successful national strategy execution lie below the strategic level when one instrument of power is tasked to integrate the efforts of other instruments of power. 40 At the regional level, no true integration of U.S. instruments of power exists, while quality results are based on quality cooperation. 41 Understandably, it could easily be argued that the same causal factors that led to forming the National Security Staff at the national level are present at the regional and local levels. Execution of strategy at the regional level is inherently prone to problems due primarily to instruments of power being organized differently and lack of directive authority. DoD is organized with six
GCCs responsible for various regions. The DoS also has six regional bureaus (led by Assistant Secretaries of State), but the boundaries do not match those of the GCCs. expeditionary capability. 42 In summary, the State and Defense departments coordinate policy at the national level, but coordination is much less and is executed in makeshift fashion at the regional level.
Local Level. At the local level for the DoS is the U.S. Embassy in a specific country. It is here where Title 10 and 22 funds are managed in support of SC/SA via the Security Assistance Officer/Organization (SAO). 43 Title 22 SA funds are based on the Presidents" budget submission, are normally year to year as mentioned earlier, and are set by program and country. 44 Understandably, the GCC may want to shift SC efforts within his region because of the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment. Because Title 22 SA funds cannot be moved from country to country, the GCC has limited flexibility to meet the ever-changing SC requirements within his region. Additionally, the ambassador, via the SAO, has no authority to move monies between accounts or activities, reducing his/her flexibility to meet SC requirements within the country.
Interagency Efforts to Improve Efficiency
National Level. One possible way to improve USG efforts at BPC is to counter the difficulties created by separate funding authorities. The U.S. Secretary of Defense has recommended pooling funds to support SC efforts. One intended effect would be forced collaboration. Before any money was to be spent, both DoD and the DoS representatives would have to approve any action within the partner nation. This would lend to breaking down the communication gap between stovepiped organizations. 45 The Secretary of Defense suggests there is a precedent for the effectiveness of pooled funds in the United Kingdom (U.K.). 46 In Wolfgang Koerner"s Security Sector Reform:
Defence Diplomacy, he describes the United Kingdom (U.K.) Government"s efforts and successes with pooled funds via the establishment of the Global Conflict and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools. These "pools" are funded via overseas development assistance (ODA) and non-ODA funds. Programs funded from these "pools" are agreed to combat operations. 55 Additionally, development of a PRSC continues to depend upon DoD to conduct a large majority of BPC activities and does not improve the directive authority problems at the regional level. Lack of political support, the remaining issue of "militarization" of foreign policy, and lack of unity of command in a region, i.e., directive authority for interagency efforts, detracts from the likely success of this proposal.
Regional Level. The most extensive option in academic circles begins by replacing the U.S. geographic combatant commands with civilian-led interagency organizations, identified as Joint Interagency Commands (JIACOM). These organizations are led by a highly credentialed civilian with a four-star military deputy.
The structure would include representatives from all major federal government agencies. Their charter would include true directive authority to all agencies below the NSC relative to activities within their assigned region, to include the U.S. embassies.
Regional lines of authority could be along current DoS or GCC boundaries, or redrawn entirely. The NSC would be responsible for integrating policy among these regional entities and proposing solutions to the President for inflexible resource or mission clashes. 
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Difficulty with this proposal begins with the increased manpower requirement for the security cooperation skillset needed to meet the expanded responsibility of the SDO and his staff. Increases are beyond the DoD capacity that currently exists for the germane skillset. 59 As such, programs to recruit, retain, and develop training for such capabilities will need to be further developed. Other challenges with this proposal are the concerns regarding militarization of foreign policy and a lack of true directive authority to integrate interagency operations from the national and regional levels.
However, lessons learned from SC/TAA best practices in Vietnam, El Salvador, and
Colombia reinforce the requirement for a focused and unified approach, which this option provides, to better achieve USG foreign policy goals. Secretary Clinton is aggressively pursuing her "smart power" initiative vis-à-vis the S/CRS. A pillar for SC success in the "Team Ukraine" model was that the "political climate was ripe." 61 The above mentioned indicators represent that the USG"s pol-mil environment is ripe for stability operations to succeed on a global scale where USG national interests are concerned. The difficulty is recognizing whether ongoing efforts are enough to meet the objective. This author suggests that they are not enough. The risk of "militarization" of foreign policy, as Secretary Gates warns, is real and detracts strongly from the USG achieving its NSS goal of "strengthening the security of at risk states." A truly "long term and sustained effort" recognizable by USG allies, partners, and non-state actors would be to embrace the JIACOM option described earlier. The monumental shift of placing a diplomatic lead in GCC "like" commands across the world would de-militarize USG foreign policy and be a balancing enforcement measure within the national security system. The JIACOM option is the best solution to actuate a USG pol-mil focus of effort to streamline the national/regional level dysfunction at the core of the USG"s diplomatic and military instruments of power. By means of an epic strategic shift such as the JIACOM, the USG may be able to realize Sun Tzu"s proverb, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." 62 
